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ABSTRACT
The theory of the competitive firm under price uncertainty is used to
develop a money metric of a producer’s willingness to pay for additional I
information. This concept is extended to the market by formulating ex-ante
and ex-post measures of the value of a rational expectations forecast. The
empirical feasibility of these measures are demonstrated by application to a
simple two equation econometric model of an agricultural market.I, INTRODUCTION
The central focus of this paper is to develop an easily computable
money metric of an agent’s willingness to pay for information under risk,
to extend this concept to the market, and to demonstrate its application in
a simple two equation econometric model of the U.S. fed cattle market.
The paper draws on previous contributions to the theory of competitive firm
under price uncertainty, namely Rothschild and Stiglitz, Sandmo, and more
recently Pope (1978, 1580) and Pope, Chavas and Just. The latter contri-
butions provide insight into the econometric application of the theory and
into the validity of producer surplus measures of firm welfare under risk.
In these models, the production decision is made given the producer’s sub-
jective distribution of output price. In this context, the value of
information to an individual agent can be formulated using a Bayesian
approach which amounts
choices based on prior
mation. Contributions
to a comparison of expected utility levels from
information with choices based on additional infor-
in this area are numerous and include those of Lindley,
Winkler, and more recently Gould and Hess who focused on the effects of risk
preferences and the nature of the distribution of random events on the value
of information. The approach developed in this paper departs from the Bayesian
method by omitting the step where agents update their prior distribution
However, the assumption that




agentsform a subjective distribution and that
be based on a comparison of utility levels is
presented in this paper facilitates empirical
application. For a restricted class of utility functions, it’s shown that
the money metric of an agent’s willingness to pay for additional information-2-
can be computed from the firm’s risk averse sQpply or factor demand function.
Whi.Leother studies (e.g., Hayami and Peterson, Freebairn, DeCanf.o)have
derived welfare estimates of the value of a forecast, the approach here is
the first, to our knowledge, to incorporate agents’ risk preferences in a
market level econometric model and to estimate the value of information as
a function of the mean and variance of a rational expectations forecast.
The problem is specified in section II followed by the conceptual
framework for measuring an individual’s willingness to pay for additional
information and the value of information to the market in section III.. To
illustrate the approach, an econometric model is specified in section IV;
and the results from fitting it to time series data from the U.S. fed cattle
market are reported in section V. The empirical results suggest (a) that
producers are risk averse, (b) that the bimonthly mean value of information
to a typical producer varies from a deflated 12 cents per cwt to 41 cents per
cwt over the 1970-80period depending on the amount of additional information,
and (c) that the mean bimonthly expected (ex-ante) value of a rational
expectations forecast to the market is about 21 cents per cwt with periodic
gains and losses to both producers and consumers.
II. THliPROBLEM
The competitive firm unde~ price uncertainty is described in a
Bernoullian framework where the agent’s expected utility function is a
strictly concave, continuous and differentiable function of profits. In
this case the primal-dual function can be expressed as ,
L* = EUIPq* - C(q*)] - EU[Pq - C(q)] (1)-3-
where the first and second bracketed terms are the indirect and direct
expected utility function respectively, P is stochastic output price, C(q)
is the cost function and E is the expectation operator. The first order
equation for a minimum is the familiar condition
8L*
— = -E[(P-c’(q)) U’(IT)]=0 aq
(2)
where U’(r) = dU/dm and C’(q) is positive and continuous.
To describe the different output choices that occur when the agent’s
distribution of output price is based on different sets of information and
to facilitate the derivation of various measures of the value of information,
two states of information are defined: the subjective and the more informed
state.
Let f“(p) denote the agentts distribution of output price in”the subjective
state based on the information utilized by the agent at the time the output ,
decision is made. The optimal quantity of output in the subjective state
can be determined by solving equation (2) for q where the expectation, denoted
Ii”,is taken with respect to f“(p). The agent’s optimal output choice will be
represented by q“. However, prior to the realization of output price, profit
is a stochastic variable and can be expressed as
o ‘n’= PqO - C(q”).
The utility in the subjective state that the agent
producing q“ is EOU(?rO).
expects to obtain from
In the more informed state the agent’s beliefs are based on more
information than is embodied in f“(p). Let fro(p)denote this more informed
distribution of output price which, while not fundamental to our approach, can
be viewed as having the properties of a Bayesian posterior distribution-4-
obtained from updating f“(p) with additional data such as an independently
supplied price forecast. The optimal output choice in the more informed state,






respect to the more informed distribution. Prior
price, profit is a stochastic variable represented
m ‘rr= Pqm- C(qm).
The utility in the more informed state that the agent expects to obtain from
producing qm is E%(’~m). ‘
The first problem is









to derive an easily computable money metric






fro(p). When the output response resulting
information by a group of agents alters
distribution must embody the price effects
are dealt with in the next section.
The Value of Information to an Individual Producer
Two different measures of the value of information to an individual
are presented. The first is an ex-ante measure. In this case,
decisions made based on information embodied in the prior f“(p) are compared
with those made in the more informed state with information embodied in fro(p). ‘
The second measure is a special case of the first; it is a measure of the
value of perfect information, determined by comparing realized’profits from
the choice q“ with profits obtained when price is known with certainty.
First, consider the
state between production
difference in expected utility in the more informed
o choices q and qm. The maximization of EOU(T) yields-5-






However, the expected utility of the choice q“ in the more
E%(To) = Em[U(PqO - C(q”)]. Hence, the value of information,
can be defined to be the difference in the more informed
expected utility of producing qm and the expected utility of
VIl = E%(mm) - E%(n”). (3)
It can be shown that VII will always be non-negative. Consider the primal-
dual problem stated in equation (1). Since EU(W*) is the maximum value of
expected utility that can be attained over all possible values of profit,
L* = EU(m*) - EU(m)~O.
By derivation of quantity qm, it is clear that qm = q* in equation (1)
when expectations are taken with respect to fro(p). Hence,
E%(mm) - EmU(w)~O
for all values of w. Thus, VII is non-negative.
This measure of the value of information is not very useful because
utility has only ordinal properties. To avoid this problem, a money metric
similar to equivalent variation in the certainty case can be derived.
Using equation (3), define a nonstochastic variable V12 such that
.
E%(mm) = E%(To + V12).~’ (4)
To show that V12 is non-negative, recall that U’(T) > 0 implies U(nl) >
U(~2), ifwl >T2. Since it has already been shown ,fromthe primal-dual
problem that E%(~m) > EmU{To), then by equation (4), E%(To+ V12) > E%(To).
By definition of expectations,
fu(~” + V12)fm(p)dp > JU(mO)fm(p)dp. (5)-6-
But by the properties of integrals, expression (5) implies U(ITO+V12)~U(n0)
for all p. $ince U’(IT)> 0, ITO+ V12~m0. And hence, V12 is non-negative.
The value of V12 is the amount of money that must be given to the agent when
he produces q“ so that his expected utility is the same as if he had produced
qm.
The empirical advantage of this approach lies in the ease of obtaining
a money metric of the value of having the additional information embodied
in fro(p). In general, knowledge of the agent’s utility function and fro(p)
are required to compute the value of information. However, knowlege of
the initial beliefs f“(p) are not required. Estimates of fro(p)may come about
through public or private price forecasts or research that yields insights
into factors determining the distribution of P.
The usefulness of this approach is enhanced if the expected utility
2/
function is restricted to a member of the following class:-
+ +
Flu= Ew + g(q,o); u = (02, ff~, l 0,, ok) (6)
where ok represents the kth central moment of price. It has been shown by
Pope and others that the indirect expected utility function corresponding
to (6) is related to the risk averse supply function as follows
aEu(~*) —=
aEP q*“ (7)
Pope, Chavas, and Just show that if equation (7) holds, producer surplus,
given by the area behind the risk averse supply curve, is a money metric “
of utility.
To derive an explicit expression for V12, the supply function in the
+
more informed state can be stated as qm
= q(p , am). Then, V12 is given by-7-
V12 =/ ‘m~(~ , :m)dp ‘q* l (~m-pqo) (8)
Pqo “
where the lower limit of integration is the value of p satisfying the
+ q“
expression q“ = q(p , urn). To show that this condition is the money
q“
‘etric ’12’ it follows from (6) that expanding (8) yields
+
V12 = jmqm - C(qm) - g(qm, am)
+
- ;mq* + C(q”) + g(q”, am) (9)
3/
which is precisely condition (4) when expected utility is of the form (6)---
This result is depicted in Figure 1. If the agent’s subjective
distribution of output price results in a pr*ducti*n level of ql”~ ‘he
value of information is given by the triangular area a. Area b depicts
the value of information when the optimal output choice in the subjective
o
state is q2 . Empirical estimates of these values
industry appear in a later section of this p’aper.
A measure of the value of perfect information
for the fed cattle
is a special case of
equation (8). With perfect information, the agent’s subjective distribution
degenerates to the nonstochastic realized price pr. If the price pr had
been known before the production decision was made, the utility maximizing
choice of output is that amount which maximizes profit. Let q* denote
*
this optimal level of production and ‘IT= Prq* - C(q*) be the corresponding
maximum profit. However, output choice q“ which maximizes expected
ro
utility based on f“(p) yields realized Pr*fit *f Tr = P q - c(q”). The
value of perfect information can be determined from equation (9).
V12 = p~q* - c(q*) - prqo - C(q”) = ?T*- mr.-8-














Figure 1. Value of Information to an Individual Agent
.-9-
The graphical analysis of the value of perfect information is similar to
Figure 1 except that the risk averse supply function is replaced by the
traditional supply function with no variance term.
The Value of Information to the Market
A money metric of the value of information to an individual producer
whose production decisions have no influence on market price has now been
presented. To determine the
consumers in a market, it is
functions. Also, additional
value of information to both producers and
necessary to consider market supply and demand
information may influence the market supply
cur,vebecause the adoption of additional information by the producers in
forming a more informed distribution of output price may result in a shift
in the market supply curve. Certainly, a more informed forecast of market
price and the variance of ehis price must incorporate these shifts in supply.
In this paper, the value ,ofa rational expectations forecast of the mean and
variance of fed cattle price which are provided by perhaps a public agency
are considered. The
value of information
in this section are:
key assumptions employed to obtain measures of the
based on the rational expectations forecasts developed
(i) all producers are identical so there is no
aggregation problem in deriving market supply, (ii) the rational expectations
forecast is given as a distribution of output price, (iii) all ~roducers in
the market adopt the forecast as their more informed distribution, (iv) all
exogenous variables whose values are unknown at the time the forecast is
formulated are assumed to follow stable stochastic processes, and (v) the
4/
agency providing the forecast is assumed to know the parameters of the model.-
For ease of exposition, it will be assumed that the distribution of output
price can be expressed in terms of its first two moments. From assumption-1o-
(i), the farm level market supply in time period t can be states as
Q;= s(Em(Pt), u:) (9) *
m where a = t




industry. The expressions Em(Pt) and o: are the first two moments
distribution of market price. Expectations are taken with respect
more informed distribution fro(p)formulated in a time period
previous to t which, by assumption (ii), is based on the rational expectations
forecast, defined below. The exogenous variables normally appearing in
equation (9) are omitted for convenience since their values are assumed to
be known when producers make production commitments.
Let
P
t = D(Q:, Zt) (lo)
denote the inverse farm level demand function where Q: denotes the quantity
demanded and Zt denotes a vector of random exogenous variables.
The model is closed by assuming that in each period the price equilibrates
quantity demanded and quantity supplied. Thus, market price can be determined
by using equations (9) and (10).
Pt = l)[S(Em(Pt),o;), Ztlo (11)
It has been assumed that the public forecast is a rational expectations
forecast; hence, expected price is determined by taking the conditional
expectation of equation (11). Depending on the form of the ,supplyand
demand functions, the rational expectations forecast can be stated as
Em(Pt) = F(u~, E(~t)) . (12)
m +
where at is defined by equation (13) and E(Zt) is the expected value in a-11-
period previous to t of the vector of exogenous variables which, by
assumption (iv), follow stable stochastic processes.
The rational expectations variance of market price is
m
‘t
= Em(Pt - Em(Pt))2. (13)
The quantity supplied can be determined by substituting equations (12)
and (13) into (9) which gives
Q;= S(F(U;, E(;t)), cl:)= S(G(O;, E(~t)). (14)
Next, ex-ante and ex-post measures of the value of a rational expectations
forecast will be developed. Rational expectations market equilibrium is
depicted in Figure 2. Expected demand, or the expectation of equation (10), is
represented by ED; and expected supply, or equation (14), is given by QS. If
producers had not been supplied with a rational expectations forecast, let Q:
be the quantity they would have produced and E(P~) be the expected price asso-
ciated with Q: based on the expected demand curve. The quantity Q: is
obtained from the supply curve (9) where the moments of the output price are
based on the producers’ subjective distribution
informed rational expectations distribution.
Marshallian consumer surplus is used as an





well known shortcomings are
recognized. The value of a rational expectations forecast is estimated by
measuring the changes in consumers’ and producers’ surplus arising from the
output choices based on the two alternative distributions f“(p) and fro(p).
Similar to measuring the value of information to an individual agent,

















Figure 2. Value of Information Under Rational Expectations
Forecasts-13-
The expected value in the more informed state of the change in \
consumers’ surplus, denoted by EmACSt when producers base production decisions
on fro(p)instead of f“(p) is given in Figure 2 by the area
EmACSt = c+d+e+f+g. (15)
For the individual producer, area a in Figure 1 measured the producer’s
willingness to pay for the information embodied in fro(p). However, when
considering the value of a rational expectations forecast to an entire market,
the adoption of fro(p)by all producers induces a decline .inexpected price
from E(P~) to Em(pt). This corresponds to a decline in producers’ surplus,
denoted EmAPSt, equivalent to the area
EmAPSt = i+j+n - (c+d+e). (16)
The expected dead weight loss (the ex-ante market value of information),
denoted E%Ire, is the triangle
E%;e = f+g+i+j+n (17)
Note that unlike the situation for the individual producer depicted in
Figure 1, it is possible for either consumers or producers, but not both, to
suffer a welfare loss from a more “accurate” distribution of market price.
Next, an ex-post measure of the value of information will be considered
which is useful in empirical application because it provides insights into
the accuracy of the ex-ante measure just presented. The ex-poqt measure of
the value of information is.the realized value of information to the market
which can be determined after the exogenous random variables in the demand
equation are observed.
+
Denote the vector of observed values of the demand function by Z;. In
+
Figure 2, RD represents the demand curve with Z;. The realized prices from
production choices Q; and Q:
r
are depicted as pt 0 and pt, respectively.-14-
The ex-post value of the change in consumers’ surplus when producers based
production decisions on fro(p)instead of f“(p) are given in Figure 2 by the.
area
ACSt = e+f+h+i+k. (18)
Similarly, by using prices p: and p;, the ex-post change in producers’
surplus is given by
APSt = n - (e+h+k+l) (19)
and the ex-post value of information to the market is
VI;e = f+i-tn-l. (20)
This value can be negative depending on the magnitude of the triangle 1 which
is determined by the realizations of the random variables.
More generally, the ex-ante value of information to the market (E%I~e)
can be stated as
Q:








upper limits of integration are the quantities supplied to
the absence and presence of a rational expectations forecast,
The second bracketed term in the expression is the inverse
function (14)0 Similarly, the ex-post value of information





(D(Qt,~;)- S-l(Qt, cr~))dQt. (22)
in the remaining sections of the paper are based on
equations (9) to (14), (21) and (22).-15-
IV. EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK
The expected utility function for an individual
not provide much insight into the functional form of
agent, equation (6), does
the indirect utility
function because ITdepends on, among other factors, the underlying production
function. For notational convenience, let V denote the form of the indirect
utility function. The procedure employed here is to approximate V by a second
order Taylor series expansion.
+ + +
Let the parameters of V be represented as the vector W = (Pl, F, u)
+
where PI is a vector of n input prices. When all the parameters have been
++
normalized around their mean values, expanding V around W = O yields
g W(:) % A(;)
v= v(;) + ~
i=l awi
wi+l/2f ~ — WiWj + higher order terms. (23)
i=l j=l awiawj





i ai; v=. ij”
J
Hence,
+ u+ !4 !?J?
v(w) = v(w) =Ci 0+1 aiwi + 1/2 ~ ~ @ijwiwj.
i=l i=l j=l
(24)
By Young’s theorem, there is symmetry between cross partial derivatives.
....n. wn+1 = ~; and Ws+n= as Thus,f3 =$... Let Wi = pli where i = 1, 2 ij J1
where s = 2, 3, .*., k. From the partial derivatives of (24) with respect to W
av ,=
!2
aw an+l + I ‘n+l,jwj”
n+1 j=l
By condition (7) equation (25) can be expressed as
(25)
$
q* = an+l + I ‘n+l,jwj + R
j=l
(26)_l(j_
where R is a residual due to the truncation of the Taylor series at the
second order.
By assumption (i), equation (26) can be multiplied by a factor of N to
obtain the market supply curve
!3




Qs= a+~ bjWj + &
j=l
Recall that it has been assumed that the distribution of output price can be








presented here, w is a vector of input prices and the mean
cattle price. A more explicit form of the supply function
n
Q; = a+~ ‘+du+&
i=l bipli(t:l.)+ Cpt t t (28)
where E includes error due to the truncation of the Taylor series. For our t
purposes here, the farm level demand for fed beef was specified in a linear
price dependent form as
Pt = e + f~~ + j~lgjZjt + Vt (29)
where Vt is the error term. Expressions for the mean and variance of a rational
expectations forecast can now be determined. Equilibrium in the market,
equation (11), requires that supply equals
n
P
t = ‘+f(a ‘i~lbipli(t-l)+cpt+dut+&t)
demand or
z
+ 1 gjzjt + ‘t
j=l
(30)-17-
Taking conditional expectations of both sides and rearranging yields the
following expression, which is equivalent to equation (12), for the expected
price of a rational expectationsforecast
n
e+f(a+ ~ bipli(t-l) +du~) + f g.E(Zjt)
Em(Pt) = i=l .=l J
l-c (31)
From equation (29), a rational expectations estimate of the variance can be
determined.
Emut = ; g; E(z 2 ~/




Estimates of the Supply and Demand Functions
Aggregate bimonthly data on cattle slaughter for the period from the
second bimonth of 1970 to the fifth bimonth of 1980 were used to estimate supply
and demand equations (28) and (29). The input prices included in the supply
equation were feeder cattle, corn, and soybean meal. However, the subjective
variables p and u are not observable. Hence, before equation (28) can be fit to
data, an auxiliary model must be formulated as an analogue of producers’ fore-
casts to obtain instruments for p and a. It is not assumed that
using rational expectations forecasts of the mean and variance of
producers were
market price.
An ARIIvLA (2, 1, O) model was used to estimate, three to four bimonths in
advance, the mean and variance of the aggregate subjective distribution of fed
cattle price, f“(p). The ARIMA model was used, in part, because Bessler found
that the ARIMA model gave the
tive distributions on yield.
casts obtained by using other
best estimates of the moments of aggregate subjec-
However, it is recognized that conditional fore-
models may have provided a better fit of the-18-
total supply equation to the data. When the supply function was fit to data,
first order autocorrelation in the disturbance terms was observed. Hence, a
modified Cochrane-Orcutt procedure was used to obtain a maximum likelihood
estimate of the autocorrelation coefficient and the data was transformed accord-
ingly.
Empirical estimates of the parameters of equation (28) appear in Table 1.
Overall, the supply function fits the data remarkable well. Coefficient estima-
tes on the price of corn and feeder cattle are significant and of the expected
sign. The soybean meal price coefficient is not significantly different from
zero indicating perhaps that soybean meal is not an extensively used input for
cattle feeding in the United States. Important for our purposes here is the
significance and expected signs of the coefficients on the ARIMA forecast of
mean
tion
and variance of cattle price. These results suggest that the supply func-
is upward sloping and that fed cattle producers are risk averse.
The exogeneous.variables used to estimate the demand equation included per
capita disposable income and a farm level index of other meats. Parameter
estimates of the bimonthly farm level demand for fed cattle appear in Table 2.
Due to the evidence of first order autocorrelation, the procedure followed to
transform the data and to obtain parameter estimates was the same as the procedure
used to fit the supply function to data. Overall, the linear price dependent
demand function appears to fit the data reasonably well although the coefficient
associated with per capita disposable income is not significantly different
from zero at the .05 level. Important for our purposes here is the significance
and expected sign of the coefficient associated with the quantity of fed cattle
demanded.-19-
Table 1. Parameter Estimates of the Market Risk Averse Supply Function






Soybean Meal Price 16,428.
**
Feeder Cattle Price -1,501,900.
Mean Fed Cattle Price 1,041,700.**
Variance of Fed Cattle Price -481,220.*
R2 is .81
#
First order autocorrelation coefficient is .45606
Variance of the estimate corrected for first order





significance of a two-tailed t-test at the .05 percent level.
significance of a two-tailed t-test at the .01 percent level.
price was the average price received by farmers in Iowa. Soybean
price, 44 percent protein, bulk in Decatur was used, Feeder
cattle price was determined by averaging 400-500 pound and 600-700 pound choice
feeder steers in Kansas City. All input prices were divided by the USDA’s index
of prices paid by farmers. The ARIMA forecasts of the mean and variance are of
the deflated average fed cattle price received by farmers in the U.S. Estimates
of fed cattle production were obtained from the USDA’s bimonthly commercial
cattle slaughter. All prices were in 1972 dollars.-20-
Table 2. Parameter Estimates of the Inverse Market Farm Level Demand Function
of Fed Cattle, Bimonthly from 197(Ito 1980.
Independent Coefficient
Variables Estimates
Constant 2.973 X 10
Quantity of Fed Cattle 3.0895 X 10-7**
Per Capita Disposable Income 6.2023 X 10-3
Farm-Level Index of Other Meats 2.798 X 10*
R2 is .86
First order autocorrelation coefficient is .84449
Variance of the estimate corrected for first order
autocorrelation is 2.6776
* Indicates significance of a two-tailed t-test at .05 percent level.
** Indicates significance of a two-tailed t-test at the .01 percent level.
Estimates of fed cattle production
bimonthly commercial cattle slaughter.
fed cattle price received by farmers in
The farm level index of other meats was
~pitQit
were obtained from the U.S.D.A.’S
Per capita disposable income and average
the U.S. were deflated to 1972 dollars.
determined as follows
L =
t hitQit + pBtQBt
where the P. and Qi are the farm level prices and quantities of chicken and
pork, and P; and QB are for beef.-21-
The Value of Information to an Individual Producer
Using equation (9) along wtih the parameter estimates reported in Table 1,
estimates of the value of informationare obtained from simulations based on two
more informed distributions of fed cattle prices. These distributions are
hypothetical because they are not based on additional analysis or composite
forecasts of the fed cattle price series. They are a more accurate description




are closer to the realized price than is the ARIMA
of the value of information for the two hypothetical
distributions mentioned above are reported in Table 3 for
1980. Descriptive statistics of the value of information
entire period 1970-1980 are reported at the bottom of the
the years 1978 to
estimates for the
table. The fed cattle
price and the corresponding ARIMA forecast and variance are also reported. For
1978 through the fourth bimonth of 1979, the ARIMA model generally underesti-
mated price and for the remainder of
mated. The variance of the forecast
The results indicate that for a
the period, fed cattle price was overesti-
increased over the period.
single producer or a group of producers
whose output levels have no noticeable effect on
information embodied in distribution (D-I) (with
cent closer to the realized price than the ARIMA
market price, the value of
the more informed mean 50 per-
mean and with more informed and
ARIMA variances equal) averages about 12 cents per cwt over the entire period
and ranges from a low of nearly zero to a high of 97 cents per cwt. The value
of information embodied in an even more accurate forecast (D-II) (with more
informed mean equal to the realized price and more informed
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period, ranging from approximately zero to a high of $2.84 cents. The high
occurred in the second bimonth of 1979 which serves to point out that the value .
of information is larger the greater the difference between q
o and qm. q“ will
tend to be smaller than qm when 7 is smaller than? and when O“ is larger than
um. qo m
will tend to be larger than q when the opposite relationships occur
between the parameters of the subjective and more informed distributions.
The value of perfect information appears in last colume of Table 3. The
estimated mean value of perfect informationis about 41 cents per cwt although
the range in value is from approximately zero per cwt to 3.96 per cwt. Again,
the largest value of information occurred in the same year as the previous case,
a year when forecast price was low and the variance of forecast price was rela-
tively high.
These results are of limited usefulness in addressing the welfare implica-
tions of a forecast when product demand is downward sloping. The results for
this case are presented next.
The Value of Information to the Market
The estimates of the value of information for an individual producer
presented in the previous section are based on a hypothetical more informed
distribution. The moments of a more informed distribution for an entire market
are theoretically based on the rational expectations conditions given by
equations (12) and (13) and are empirically based on equations (31) and (32),~’
The estimates of the ex-ante and ex-post value of information to the market
are based on equations (21) and (22), respectively. The results of this
analysis appear in Table 4.
The mean and variance of the rational expectations forecast appear in







the variance of the ARIMA forecast in column three of Table 3 shows that the
rational expectationsforecasts exhibit smaller variances. A comparison of .
columns three and four of Table 4 shows the relationship between the rational
expectations forecast Em(Pt) and realized price when all producers are assumed
to adopt the forecast p:; this is depicted in Figure 2. The difference in these
prices are attributable to the values obtained by the random variables in the
model.
The expected realized price Em(P~) which appears in column 2 of Table 4
is the price that is expected to prevail if producers do not adopt the forecast.
(See Figure 2). The closer the expected realized price is to the rational
m is to Q:; and hence, the smaller expectations forecast of price, the closer Qt
the value of information. Additional results not reported in the table suggest
that the adoption of a rational expectations forecast will have only a small
effect on fed cattle production. For the period from 1570 to 1980, the mean of
the expected bimonthly production when all producers are assumed to adopt the
rational expectations forecasts is 98.32 percent of the mean bimonthly pro-
duction levels actually produced.
The expected value of information to the market given by equation (21)
appears in the sixth column of Table 4. The mean expected bimonthly value of
information for the 1970-1980 period was $.21 per cwt of production or, in
total value terms, a mean of approximately $13.3 million per bimonth. The
expected value of information ranges in value between virtually zero to a maximum
of $1.47 per cwt; the minimum value occurred in the fifth bimonth of 1979 while
the maximum value occurred in the second bimonth of 1974. The expected value of
information increases when the ARIMA forecasts diverge from the rational
expectations forecast depending on the relative variances of the forecasts.-26-
This divergence tends to occur at turning points in the ARIMA price series where
prices differ from those of the rational expectations price series.
Not appearing in the table are the ex-ante expected producer and consumer
gains and losses from adopting the rational expectations forecasts which are
given by equations (18) and (19). The bimonthly mean value of information to
producers of fed cattle during 1970 to 1980 was estimated to be $.49 per cwt,
ranging from a minimum of $-2.04 to a maximum of $4.76. On average, consumers
lose $.28 per cwt from the adoption of the rational expectations forecast by
producers. The ‘rangein consumer gains and losses is from a high of $2.86 to a




under the rational expectations forecast are less than the
produced. The converse relationship holds for expected
As indicated by equation (22), the ex-post value of information in the
market is obtained after the random variables in the supply and demand curves
have been observed. These ex-post values, appearing in the last column of
Table 4, provide insights into the validity of the ex-ante estimates of the
value of information. The mean bimonthly value of this ex-post measure is
approximately $.15 per cwt, ranging from $-.37 to $1.45. Of the 64 bimonthly
estimates obtained, negative values, although small, were reported 36 percent
of the time. Hence, the adoption of the forecast by producers would have
resulted in a “realized” welfare loss to the market 36 percent of the time.
Nevertheless, the gains still outweighed these losses.
The mean of the bimonthly estimates of the ex-post value of information
to producers average $.43 per cwt., a small decline from the above reported
figure for the ex-ante value of information. The range varies from a high of-27-
$4.15 per cwt. to a low of $-1.68 per cwt. The 10SS to consumers was
virtually unchanged at $0.29 per cwt., with a range of $2.77 per cwt. to
$-3.28 per cwt.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
An easily computable money metric of a risk averse agent’s willingness
to pay for additional information was developed and extended to the market
in this paper. The procedure was empirically demonstrated for a restricted
class of utility functions by fitting a risk averse supply function and a
farm level demand function to time series data from the U.S. fed cattle
industry. While, in our view, this paper makes a contribution to methods
for estimating the value of information, numerous restrictive assumptions
were employed; and numerous hurdles remain before reliable empirical estimates
can be obtained on the informational efficiency of markets. For instance,
our approach does not take account of an agent’s updating of information
along Bayesian lines, nor is the cost of information acquisition and processing
included in the conceptual framework. While the empirical framework was
only developed to illustrate the application of the conceptual framework,
it nevertheless serves to illustrate both the strengths and weakness of this
approach. A significant weakness is the restrictions that must be placed
on the class of utility functions for empirical purposes. Consideration of
both price and production risk can also further complicate the empirical
model, and the specification of an empirical framework as an analogue of
agents1 expectation formation process is particularly troublesome. Never-
theless, the empirical analysis gives plausible results. The empirical results
suggest that agents are risk averse, that the expected value of an improved
forecast does increase producer utility, and that the expected market value-28-
of information is of empirical magnitudes that are plausible. These results
lend to the feasibility and credibility of further experimentation with this
approach.
FOOTNOTES
~/ Lindley (1971) describes a similar measure for the value of infor-
mation, Z, given by E6[U(nP - z)] = EBIU(ITO)],where expectations are taken with
respect to the Bayesian posterior distribution f~(p). Although both Lindley’s
Z and our V12 are measures of the amount the agent is willing to pay to obtain
more information, in general they may not be equal. There is also a subtle
difference in interpretation. In the Bayesian approach Z is the amount of
money which must be given up by the agent when he produces q6 so that he has
the same amount of utility in the more informed state aS producing q“. In
our case, V12 is the amount of money that must be given to the agent when he
produces q“ so that his expected utility in the more informed state is the
same as if he had produced qm. See Roe and Antonovitz for a graphical analysis
of this and other measures of a money metric when fro(p)has only two parameters.
~/ Antonovitz estimated a supply function for the fed beef industry
employing the assumption that agents’ utility functions were members of the
class given by equation (6). The data failed to reject this hypothesis.
3_/ The value V12 can also be obtained from the risk averse factor demand
function, -aEu(T*)/ac = x*, where C is the price of input X, in a manner
analogous to (9).-29-
~/ Frydman suggests that a rational expectations equilibrium is possible
only if agents know the true parameters of the model or that prices converge to
a rational expectations equilibrium if agents have consistent estimates of the
parameters. Hence, assumption (v) guarantees that a rational expectations
equilibrium exists.
5_/ It is assumed
the true values of the
that the endogeneous variables are independent and that
parameters are known.
~/ This is similar to Freebairn’s choice of a more accurate forecast of
the mean.
~/ The mean and variance of the stochastic processes of the exogenous
variables of the demand function were estimated using a moving ARIMA model.
For the income variable, an ARIMA (1, 1, O) was used. For the index variable,
an ARIMA (2, 1, 2) was used.-30-
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